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Abstract: Education is one of the most important services provided by public governments in 
almost  every  country  worldwide.  However, the most important cross-country observations 
about education – like the PISA report by the OECD or the TIMSS by the IEA – focus only 
on  international  benchmarks  to  compare  the  knowledge  capacity  of  pupils.  This  paper 
provides a general overview of the different forms to finance education in the framework of 
intergovernmental transfers as well as educational providers in ten European countries. We 
observe the educational system in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden,  Switzerland  and  the  United  Kingdom  and  point out the similarities and national 
distinctions in the respective transfer system regarding education financing or the allocation 
mechanism for primary and secondary schools as well as universities.  
  
JEL Classification: H7, H1, I2 
Keyword:  Intergovernmental  transfers,  Educational  Finance,  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom   2
1. Introduction 
Education is one of the most important services provided by public governments in almost 
every country worldwide. However, education and its indirectly linked expenditure – like for 
example  school  meals  or  the  cost  of  school  transportation  –  can  be  provided  by  public 
governments  as  well  as  private  companies  or  households.  Moreover,  the  expenditure  for 
education is not only spent in the educational institutions themselves, because the agency and 
Ministry, which support the education process by developing curricula or generating further 
vocational  training  for  teachers,  are  also  cost-intensive.  The  following  table  1  provides  a 
general overview of the different types of educational expenditure:  




and private institution 
Public schools  Curricula developed by the Ministry of 
Education 
Private schools without any subsidies 
by public governments 
Further vocational training of teachers 
financed by private foundations 
Education 
Private schools financed by fees and 
public governments 
Evaluation, which grads the teaching ability 
of professors, financed by public and private 
institutions 
University research funded by public 
governments 
Research to strengthen the teaching ability by 
the Ministry of Education 
University  research  funded  by 
companies or private foundations 
Research  to  optimise  the  class  schedule  by 
private companies 
Research
University research funded by public 
and private institution 
Research  to  ease  the  integration  of  foreign 
children  founded  by  public  and  private 
institutions  
Maintenance  of  school  buildings  by 
public governments 
Voluntary  school  meals  offered  by  public 
governments 
Sports activities or ancillary services 
provided by private clubs 
Student  grants  for  apartments  and  further 
living costs founded by private foundations 
Miscellaneous
Public-Private-Partnerships  at  the 
new building of schools 
School  transportation  organized  by  private 
companies,  which  were  paid  by  public 
governments 
     Source: own illustration 
In the United States of America or Canada private institutions are a mayor source to finance 
educational expenditure. In Europe the impact of private institutions on the education sector is 
lower compared to the USA and Canada. In the majority of all European countries the pupils 3
attend public schools, except in Belgium, where over 56 % of all pupils in the primary and 
secondary schools go to private schools. However, all private Belgian schools are also mainly 
funded  by  the  government.  The  following  figure  1  presents  a  summary  of  the  school 
landscape – as a distribution between private and public schools - in ten European countries in 
the school year of 2001 / 2002:  
Figure 1: Distribution of pupils in the secondary and primary schools according to the institution type, 
who attended school in the school year of 2001 /2002
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public schools Government-dependent private schools 
independet private schools total private schools
Source: own calculation and European Commission, 2005, page 74. 
The  total  public  expenditure  on  education  related  to  the  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP), 
which can be observed in the following figure 2, varies between 4.4 % in Spain and 8.5 % in 
Denmark: 





















 Source: own calculation and European Commission, 2005, page 163.4
Moreover,  the  salaries  of  the  teachers  and  school  heads  in  the  European  primary  and 
secondary schools vary within a country – mainly due to the age of teachers or the size of the 
school and to a lesser extent due to their individual qualifications – and between the ten 
observed countries. The following figures 3 and 4 point out the salary structure of teachers 
and school heads in nine European countries
3 in the school year of 2000-2001 based on a 
salary per capita national GDP ratio:    
Figure 3: Salary structure of teachers in primary schools in the school year of 2000-2001 based on salary 
per capita GDP ratio (100 = the teacher earns the exact amount of the national GDP)

















Source: own illustration based on various data provided by the Eurydice 
Figure 4: Salary structure (minimum and maximum) of school heads in upper secondary schools in the 
school year of 2000-2001 based on salary per capita GDP ratio 
















 Source: own illustration based on various data provided by the Eurydice 5
The Italian teachers and school heads received the lowest minimum salary level in relation to 
their national GDP per capita, while the school heads of the British upper secondary school 
earned the highest salaries. In both comparison, Germany has the smallest salary gap between 
the minimum and maximum salary of the teachers and the school heads.   
A number of professionals in the public administrations or politically interested groups opine 
quite  often  that  a  higher  educational  output  can  only  be  received  by  means  of  a  higher 
concentration of expenditure on the education system. However, the empirical observations 
do not underline such an absolute argumentation, because additional funds available to an 
existing  education  system  of  a  country  have  not  improved  the  pupil  performance  in  a 
sustainable manner (see Gundlach, Gmelin and Wößmann, 2001; Hanushek, 2003; Krueger, 
2003; Wößmann and West, 2006)
4. Furthermore, pupils from a country with a significantly 
higher level of educational expenditure or smaller class sizes than other countries are not 
necessarily in a better condition in an international comparison (see Wößmann, 2003). In fact, 
the actual research suggests that about two-thirds of the variation in student achievement is 
the product of home environments, not schools.
5
For this reason, the education system of a country can be improved not only by the additional 
allocation of finances, but rather the accountability in the educational sector is one of the key 
factors. However, However, accountability in the framework of education is a highly intricate 
concept and we try to simplify the different interactions and players in the following figure 5 
in  which  the  consumers  provide  their  preferences  of  elected  and  non-elected  institutions. 
These institutions try to reproduce the wishes to the providers of the education and “constrict” 
the work of the providers of education by regulation and financial sources:   
Figure 5: Accountability in (public) education 
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2. Educational expenditure assignments between the different tiers of government  
Decentralisation  of  education  is  one  possibility  to  strengthen  the  accountability  and  to 
produce  some  positive  incentives  for  all  actors  in  the  education  process.  Education 
decentralisation can be classified as follows:
6
•  Education deconcentration, Deconcentration describes the situation in which the central 
ministry of education shifts some responsibility to their own regional or local offices, but 
these offices are still a part of the central administration. In Germany the states are the 
major decision-makers for primary and secondary schools and every state has its own 
regulation  concerning  the  maximum  number  of  pupils  for  a  class.  However,  the  final 
decision of whether an additional class will be offered at a school belongs to the local 
educational administration (staatliche Schulämter) and the school itself can only file an 
application for a further class.
•  Education devolution, Devolution includes the transfer of responsibility from the central 
government to an independent and elected tier of government like states and provinces or 
even  local  authorities.  This  form  of  educational  decentralisation  can  be  observed  in 
Belgium and Spain, where the central government, in the transformation process from a 
unitary country to a federal country, has shifted mayor responsibility in the secondary and 
primary  system  to  the  Belgian  language  communities  and  the  Spanish  Autonomous 
Communities.
•  Education  delegation,  Delegation  means  that  one  tier  of  government  has  shifted  the 
decision-making responsibility to the school, but de jure this responsibility still belongs to 
this tier of government. A practical example is the Danish primary school system where 
some municipalities have delegated the responsibility to their respective schools, but the 
Danish municipalities can reclaim their rights in this respect at any time.   
A huge number of possible educational functions and areas exists, which can be decentralized 
like  teacher  hiring  and  dismissal,  teacher  salary  specification,  school  construction  and 
maintenance,  the  evaluation  of  the  performance  of  the  schools  as  well  as  universities, 
examination and degree of supervision of a school head, faculty dean or university president 
and finally the structure and organisation of the schools and universities itself. Moreover, in 
some European countries, like Belgium, Spain or Switzerland, the question of the official 
teaching languages is a very hot “political potato”, while in Denmark and Italy with their 
small German-speaking minorities as well as the Danish minority in the northern German 
state  of  Schleswig-Holstein,  the  teaching  language  plays  only  minor  role.  In  Europe,  the 
curriculum and the teaching methods are in mainly fixed by the central ministry of Education 7
and  their  respective  regional  offices  and  only  the  subnational  governments  of  Belgium, 
Germany and Spain posses an independent in this area. Finally, as a matter of fact it is also 
possible  to  decentralise  the  financing  of  education  from  the  central  government  to  the 
subnational  and  local  authorities.  Under  the  goal  of  strengthening  the  accountability, 
decentralisation of the financing of the educational expenditure is reasonable, because on the 
one hand the school providers have to consider the preferences of the citizens and clients and 
on the other hand the educational providers are not influenced by the central government and 
can make their decisions quite independently. Nevertheless, “over-decentralisation” also has 
negative  impacts  (see  Werner,  Guihéry  and  Djukic,  2006)  and  especially  universities 
generates huge education spill-over, which are not redundant.     
In many European Union countries, local authorities play a significant part in the provision of 
compulsory education. This participation is the result of different levels of autonomy in every 
country and the different kinds of schools considered. 
A  group  of  certain  local  authorities  –  mainly  in  the  Nordic  countries  and  in  the  United 
Kingdom – themselves undertake the funding of schools and determine the amount of funds, 
which are used for education. These local authorities use their own tax revenues as well as 
vertical government transfers to provide primary and secondary education. In other countries, 
the educational expenditure is fixed at a higher government level, but the local authority may 
– or must – supplement it with its own resources. In a third group, the budget volume for 
education is determined and financed completely by higher tiers of government, but the local 
governments can decide how this fixed budget is distributed between the different forms of 
schools as well as between equal school forms. These three forms of classification can be 
observed in the field of teacher salaries, in the maintenance and construction of new schools 
as well as in the necessary equipment for schools. 
A further classification, based on the level of autonomy and the highest level of government 
which participates in the education system, can also be used to characterise the European 
education landscape. While the British and Scandinavian local authorities consider about huge 
autonomy,  the  local  authorities  in  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Italy  and  Austria  are  only 
responsible for the operational resources and the school buildings. However, in this second 
group of these five European countries the local authorities are not responsible for the salaries 
of the teachers, and in Italy and Spain are the local authorities are not completely responsible 
for the equipment and the operational resources in the schools.   
Belgium  and  Switzerland  can  be  placed  into  a  third  group,  because  on  the  one  hand  the 
complete education finances of the primary and secondary schools are shifted from the central 8
government to the respective regional governments.
7 However, the 26 Swiss cantons and the 
three Belgian (speaking) communities empower their local authorities with different forms of 
autonomy  and  therefore  both  countries  can  be  described  as  a  huge  “tangled  web”.  For 
example, the Canton of Schwyz claims a tuition fee for secondary schools, while the parents 
in the canton of Zurich do not have to pay such a school fee. Moreover, the municipalities in 
the Canton of Schwyz are able to pay higher salaries at the primary schools to attract highly 
qualified teachers, whereas in the canton of Zurich such a “salary competition” does not exist. 
The following tables 2 and 3 summarise very generally the different education assignments 
and financial responsibilities for the universities, the secondary schools and primary schools 
regarding  the  teacher  salaries,  the  maintenance  and  the  construction  of  new  educational 
institutions as well as the necessary equipment for education between the respective tiers of 
government:  
Table 2: Financial responsibility of education between the different tiers of government   
Universities  Secondary schools  Primary schools 
  Salaries Buildings Equipment Salaries Buildings Equipment Salaries Buildings Equipment
Austria 
8                  
central X  X  X  X  X  X       
regional             X      
local               X  X 
Belgium 
9                  
central                  
regional X  X  X  X      X     
upper-local         X        X   
lower-local         X  X    X  X 
Denmark 
10                  
central X  X  X             
upper-local                  
lower-local        X    X   X   X   X   X  
France                   
central X  X  X  X      X     
upper-local         X  X       
lower-local               X  X 
Germany 
11                  
central   X  X             
regional X  X  X  X    X  X    X 
upper-local         X      X   
lower-local                  9
Table 2: Financial responsibility of education between the different tiers of government 
Universities  Secondary schools  Primary schools 
Salaries Buildings Equipment Salaries Buildings Equipment Salaries Buildings Equipment
Italy 
12                  
central X  X   X  X       X     
regional           X       
upper-local         X      X  X 
lower-local                  
Spain                   
central X  X  X             
regional X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X   
upper-local                  
lower-local                 X 
Sweden                   
central X  X  X             
upper-local                  
lower-local        X  X  X  X  X  X 
Switzerland                  
central X  X  X             
regional       X  X  X  X     
local         X  X  X  X  X 
UK                    
central X  X  X             
upper-local                  
lower-local       X  X  X  X  X  X 
Source: own illustration 
Table 3: Content and administration responsibility for schools between the different tiers of government 













Austria                
National MoE X  X  X         
Regional MoE        X  X  X   
Local education a.         (X)  (X)  X 
School (board)   (X)          (X) 
Belgium                
National MoE              
Regional MoE  X    X  X  X  X  X 
Local education a.              
School (board)   X           10
Table 3: Content and administration responsibility for schools between the different tiers of government 













Denmark                
National MoE X    (X)      EVA
13   
Regional MoE               
Local education a.     X        X 
School (board)   X  X  X  X    X 
France               
National MoE X    X  X  X  académie
14   
Regional MoE               
Local education a.             X 
School (board)   X           
Germany               
National MoE     X         
Regional MoE  X  (X)    X  X  X  (X) 
Local education a.           X  X 
School (board)   X          (X) 
Italy                
National MoE X  X  X  X  (X)  INVALSI
15     
Regional MoE               
Local education a.         X    X 
School (board)              
Spain               
National MoE (X)    X      X   
Regional MoE  X      X  X  X  X 
Local education a.              
School (board)   X          X 
Sweden               
National MoE X          NAE   
Regional MoE               
Local education a.           (X)   
School (board)   X  X  X  X  X  X 
Switzerland               
National MoE              
Regional MoE  X  X  X  X  X    (X) 
Local education a.           X  X 
School (board)   (X)          (X) 11
Table 3: Content and administration responsibility for schools between the different tiers of government 













UK                
National MoE X    X      Ofsted
16   
Regional MoE               
Local education a.         X  (X)   
School (board) (X)  X    X      X 
Source: own illustration 
3. Consideration of the education cost in the intergovernmental transfer system 
Grants  and  transfers  from  national  to  subnational  governments  or  from  subnational 
governments to local authorities exist in federal as well as unitary countries. However, the 
characteristics of these conceptions differ between the countries and are mainly influenced by 
the geographical, cultural and political circumstances.  
If intergovernmental transfers are used as an interregional equalisation system, the two major 
goals of the equalisation are to lower the vertical fiscal gap between governments and to 
reduce the spill-over effects. Furthermore, the economic reasons for an equalisation system 
can  be  assumed  by  fiscal  imbalance,  minimum  standards  of  service,  interjurisdictional 
spillovers, differential net fiscal benefits across states and stabilisation objectives (see Shah, 
1995, page 216-219).  
Moreover,  fiscal  equalisation  can  obtain  both  a  vertical  and  a  horizontal  dimension. 
Horizontal  equalisation  is  typically  combined  with  asymmetric  vertical  grants  designed to 
close  vertical  fiscal  gaps  and  to  correct  regional  fiscal  imbalances.  A  classic  example  of 
horizontal equalisation is the German equalisation system among the federal states or the 
Nordic  local  equalisation  system.  The  Australian  case  can  be  described  as  a  vertical 
equalisation with a strong horizontal effect.  A very unique situation is the conception of 
national tributes to the European Community where economically weaker nations have to pay  
a smaller transfer, measured per capita, than the economically stronger nations. A similar 
weak supranational government without its own tax revenues like the EU existed in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina until the introduction of the VAT in 2006 (see Werner, Guihéry and Djukic, 
2006).  The  following  figure  6  illustrates  the  different  approaches  to  interregional  fiscal 
equalisation: 
  12
Figure 6: Examples of fiscal equalisation among regional administrative bodies 
   
               Source: Spahn / Werner, forthcoming 
Like the general characteristics of the intergovernmental transfer system, the ten European 
countries consider education costs in their respective transfer systems in very different ways. 
The majority of the countries (Germany, Austria, Spain, Belgium and Italy) have devolved 
major  parts  of  their  education  system  to  their  subnational  governments,  but  the  central 
government does not equalise the exact cost of the education delivery and the subnational 
governments benefit from a general tax sharing of the personal income tax (PIT) and the value 
added tax (VAT). The fixed portion of the tax revenues is distributed between the subnational 
government mostly by the number of the inhabitants for the VAT and by the principle of 
residence  for  the  PIT
17.  Only  Belgium  considers,  among  other  indicators,  the  number  of 
potential students for the distribution of the so-called “VAT grant”
18 between the Flemish and 
Walloon community.   
Switzerland has recently reformed its equalisation system. The new § 132 of the constitution 
introduces a tax sharing of the withholding tax, of which the cantons receive 10 %
19 of the 
whole  tax  yield,  and  the  new  inter-cantonal  fiscal  equalisation  system  (NFA)  has  been 
approved and will be fully implemented in 2008. Because of the huge tax autonomy of the 
cantons and municipalities, Switzerland cannot be grouped into the same tax-sharing class. 
Moreover,  in  Switzerland  a  horizontal  equalisation  between  the  cantons  exists,  in  which 
cantons without universities or with students who attend the university of a neighbouring 
canton,  have  to  pay  a  transfer  to  the  canton  which  provides  the  university.  This  kind  of 
educational  cost  equalisation  is  very  reasonable  and  in  accordance  with  the  theoretical 
framework to reduce spill-over effects between the same tiers of government.        
In its local horizontal equalisation system, Denmark also considers the educational costs, like 
in  Switzerland,  but  Denmark  does  not  use  a  pure  educational  equalisation.  Instead,  the 
measurement of the different expenditure needs also considers the ageing structure of the 13
population or the portion of migrants and the respective tax base of the municipality and 
Amtskommuner (see Werner and Shah, forthcoming).  
Finally,  France  and  the  United  Kingdom  do  not  practise  any  tax-sharing  or  horizontal 
equalisation system. Both countries use vertical grants from the central government to the 
subnational governments to finance the education cost. The following figure 7 summarises the 
different considerations of educational costs in the ten European countries: 
Figure 7: Consideration of educational costs in the respective intergovernmental transfer system 
    Source: own illustration 
After the general classification of the ten European countries in four categories the following 
section  deals  with  a  detailed  description  of  six  country-specific  arrangements  to  finance 
education.       
Germany uses a tax sharing system between all tiers of governments for its most important 
taxes and the German equalisation system does not consider any education cost (see Spahn, 
1997, Werner, 2003; Werner / Xue, 2004 as well as Guihéry / Werner, 2005).  
However, since 1969, the German constitution
20 has determined that the new construction a of 
university  is  a  common  task  of  the  central  government  and  the  16  states.  Therefore,  a 
university building planning commission (UBPC)
21 exits, which consists of representatives of 
the Bund and the Bundesländer and decides about the priority of the new buildings. The exact 
distribution between the central government and the states as well as within the states varies 
from fiscal year to fiscal year, but the main goal is that the Bund covers nearly 50 % of the 
Consideration of the education costs 
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total cost and each state has to pay 50 % of the building cost of its respective university.  The 
UBPC has already developed 34 planning reports and the actual 34. report covers the time 
period of 2005-2008.
22 The following table 4 points out the result of the 1st planning report of 
1972, the last planning report before the reunification in 1989 and the completed planning 
report for 2003:  
Table 4: Structures of the planning report of the UBPC in € million in 1972, 1989 and 2003  
1972  1989  2003 
State  Bund  Total  State  Bund  Total State Bund total 
Saarland  5  3  8  36  21  57  24  14  38 
Lower Saxony  67  68  135  53  46  99  92  70  162 
Rhineland-Palatinate  13  34  47  53  39  92  33  28  61 
Schleswig-Holstein  11  30  41  44  35  79  193  147  340 
North Rhine-Westphalia  151  268  419  125  76  201  92  70  162 
Baden-Wuerttemberg  67  148  215  193  109  302  186  153  339 
Bavaria  86  97  183  207  99  306  188  218  406 
Hesse  58  87  145  71  39  110  81  68  144 
Berlin  14  19  33  50  36  86  36  46  82 
(Hanseatic city) Bremen   11  26  37  21  19  40  23  31  54
(Hanseatic city) Hamburg  16  22  38  28  19  47  44  29  73
Saxony-Anhalt  -  -  -  -  -  -  53  47  105 
Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania 
-  -  -  -  -  -  36  38  74 
Thuringia  -  -  -  -  -  -  68  48  116 
Saxony  -  -  -  -  -  -  78  66  144 
Brandenburg  -  -  -  -  -  -  42  30  72 
All states  499  -  -  891  -  -  1,246 -  - 
Total Central government  -  802  -  -  528  -  -  1,060 - 
All tiers of government  -  -  1,301  -  -  1,419 -  -  2,306 
 Source:  UBCP, 2005, page 28-29 
Since 1970, Belgium has changed from a unitary country to a federal country with four tiers 
of subnational governments. Especially the three language communities (Flemish, French and 
German)  as  well  as  three regions (Flanders, Walloon and Brussels) have provoke a quite 
complex structure, due to the fact that every tier of government possesses different forms of 
revenues and the Flemish community and Flemish region additionally have a common budget. 
Therefore Gérard’s description of the Belgian federalism as a „twofold federalism“ (Gérard, 
2001, page 10) is skilful.  15
Compared to Austria, where the subnational portion of the PIT and the VAT is mainly based 
on  the  inhabitant  number,  as  well  as  Germany  and  Spain,  which  also  use  the  derivation 
principle for the PIT distribution, the Belgian tax sharing system is different and therefore 
instead of tax sharing, the phrases “VAT transfer” or “PIT transfer” are sometimes used to 
describe the Belgian intergovernmental transfer system. However, in the respective financial 
law itself the two transfers are called a shared tax, since its funding comes from the proceeds 
of the federal PIT and the VAT.   
The total amount of the “VAT transfer” to the two communities increases by the same growth 
rate as the consumer price index. The distribution of the fixed VAT portion between the 
Flemish  and  the  Walloon  community  is  based  on  –  generally  speaking  –  the  number  of 
students in each of the two communities (for a detailed description see Van der Stichele and 
Verdonck, 2001).   
In Switzerland all three tiers of government can levy their tax rates independently on the 
direct taxes, but since 2001 the tax base of the direct taxes as well as the tax year have been 
completely harmonised. Therefore the tax “jungle” (Duss and Bird, 1979, page 62) has now 
dwindled a bit but it has not yet been fully cut back, especially regarding the PIT and the 
wealth tax.  
On the other side, all revenues from indirect taxes like the VAT or all excises belong to the 
central government and only a small tax-sharing between the central government and cantons 
exist for the stamp taxes and the withholding taxes.
23   
In the context of the educational cost, in Switzerland a very smart solution for the financing of 
the universities exists. In Switzerland 12 universities exist and two of twelve – the Swiss 
Federal Institutes of Technology (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, ETH) in Lausanne 
and Zurich – are institutions of the central government. The remaining 10 universities are 
located in 10 cantons and therefore 16 of 26 Swiss cantons do not have to finance a university 
directly. However, it happens very often in Switzerland that a student has his residence in one 
canton but he attends the university of a neighbouring canton. This situation can be used as a 
classical example of spill-overs, and a possible solution could be the concept of functional, 
overlapping, and competing jurisdictions (FOCJ) developed by Frey and Eichenberger (see 
Frey and Eichenberger 1995).  
Nevertheless, the cantons do not use the FOCJ concept to solve this problem, but the canton 
where a university is placed receives funds from the other cantons, where the commuting 
students have their residence. The calculation of the funds is very detailed, which means that 16
the different costs of a faculty towards a university as well as the respective duration of every 
student have to be borne in mind for the calculation. 
The total expenditure cost of 12 universities amounted to € 3.16 billion in 2004, while nearly 
20% originated at the ETH Zurich and 52 % was generated by the ETH Zurich, the University 
of Zurich and the University of Geneva. Moreover, the impact of the inter-cantonal university 
equalisation differs from university to university and has it highest influence at the University 
of Basle city and the University of Italian Switzerland. A detailed overview of the financial 
structure of the twelve universities can be observed in the following figure 8: 
Figure 8: Financing structure of the 12 Swiss universities in 2004
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central government SNF private funds 
    Source: own calculation based on Bundesamt für Statistik, 2005, page 12 
Like in all Nordic countries, the Danish local authorities have a huge impact on all areas of 
public expenditure and generate one of the highest portions of the national GDP worldwide. 
The  Danish  municipalities  and  counties  (Amtskommuner)  are  mainly  financed  by  local 
surcharges on the PIT. Moreover, the Danish local tax sovereignty also consists of some local 
property taxes (Grundskyld, Daekningsafgig and Frigorelseafgift) and the grants from the 
central government are not as important as in other European countries.       
However, in Denmark a very all-embracing local equalisation system exists which includes 
the following four elements: equalisation of the expenditure needs between the respective 
local tiers of government, equalisation of the tax bases between the municipalities and the 
respective local tiers, general grants from the central government and various special grants 
from the central government (see Werner and Shah, forthcoming).  17
The equalisation of the expenditure needs is based on the age of the municipal citizens as well 
as  on  some  social  factors  like  for  example  children  with  a  single  parent,  the  number  of 
unemployed people or welfare recipients. Indeed, the actual educational cost of a municipality 
is not completely considered in the Danish local equalisation system, but the very detailed age 
diversification and the fact that one of the highest amounts per capita is assigned for pupils 
(age group 7-16) produces a strong bias.  
France has a four-tier government structure and due to the “two decentralization laws” of 
1982  the  regions  and  départements  received  for  the  first  time  a  completely  constitutional 
status in France. 
In  the  framework  of  the  decentralisation  laws  of  1982,  the  départements  gained  the 
responsibility  for  the  maintenance  and  new  construction  of  the  collèges,  which  is  the 
mandatory secondary school for pupils of the age of 11 to 14, while the region have been 
responsible for the new construction and the maintenance of the second wing of the secondary 
school; the lycées are visited by French pupils from the age of 15 to 18. Because of shift of 
this fiscal burden from the central government to the upper local authorities, the regions and 
départements  received  a  transfer  called  the  Dotation  générale de decentralization (DGD). 
Due to the grant reform of the year of 2004, the DGD was reduced significantly, the regions 
benefited for the first time from the Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement (DGF) and one of 
the major features of the French grant system is the high degree of block grants compared to 
specific subsidies (see Prud’homme, 2006). A further important block grant in France is the 
compensation  grant  due  to  taxation  of  local  investments  by  the  national  VAT  (Fond  de 
compensation de la TVA, FCTVA) and therefore the local authorities receive a rebate of their 
VAT  payments  for  investments  from  the  central  government.  Especially  for  the  new 
construction of school buildings such a tax rebate for the VAT should not be underrated.    
Furthermore, the regions and the départements are newly involved at a tax sharing of the TIPP 
(interior tax on oil products). For the long run the central government plans to allow regional 
tax setting (see Guengant and Josselin, 2006, page 10). 
Moreover,  the  French  ministry  of  education  introduced  a  special  programme  called  zones 
d’éducation prioritaire (ZEP) in 1982. The goal of the ZEP is to strengthen the education of 
pupils with a migration background or pupils whose parents receive social welfare. If a school 
is classified as a ZEP school, the average classroom size will be reduced and the teacher 
salary will be increased. This “positive discrimination” has not avoided the fact that the pupils  
from ZEP schools achieve lower results in national educational evaluation tests (see Meuret, 
1994 or Caille, 2001). But on the other hand, all opponents of the ZEP idea  have to consider 18
that  without  these  special  subsidies  the  gap  between  the  pupils  would  probably  be  much 
bigger.  
The  local  authorities  in  the  UK  possess  some  of  the  smallest  tax  sovereignty  of  all 
industrialised countries worldwide, because their own tax revenues plus charges and fees only 
amount to less than one-third of the total revenues of the local authorities. Their main revenue 
source  is  the  grants  from  the  central  government,  e.g.  the  English  local  authorities  were 
funded to an extent of 62 % (including the “redistributed” business tax) by grants in the fiscal 
year of 2003-2004 (see ODPM, 2005, page 33). 
In the fiscal year of 2003-2004 the central government introduced a new calculation of the 
grants called Formula Spending Shares (FSS), which replaced the old calculation formula 
named  Standard  Spending  Assessments  (SSAs).  The  following  table  11  points  out  the 
structure of grants towards the local authorities in England in the fiscal year of 2005-2006: 
Table 11: Structure of the grants to the local authorities in England in 2005-2006 
in %  € billion 
General block grant   44.43  %  38.694 
“Redistributed” business tax  29.92 %  26.060 
General and specific purpose grants  18.39 %  16.019 
Police grant  7.26 %  6.302 
Total   100 %  87.075 
                                 Source: own illustration based on various publication of ODPM 
The general block grant consists of children’s service, adults personal social service, fire and 
rescue, highway maintenance, environmental and cultural service, police and capital financing 
of seven components. Like in the Nordic countries, the respective local expenditure needs
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are considered in this block grant, but the local authorities are free to spend the grant in any 
area of expenditure.  
Every one the seven components has nearly the same value in the equalisation formula and 
the  “children  service”  component  is  mainly  influenced  by  educational  needs  like  the 
residential pupil number of each local authority. The “children service” component itself has 
four sub-components and besides the number of pupils and their different ages the number of 
pupils with a migration background or the distinction between primary or secondary pupils is 
also  considered.  The  remaining  six  components  of  the  general  block  grant  consider  very 
marginally
25 or not at all not any educational needs in their formula.  
In the last few years the central government has increased the general and specific purpose 
grants compared to the block grant. This development has weakened the transparency of the 
British grant system and has undermined the revenue sovereignty of the local authorities, but 19
on the other hand the maintenance or the new construction of school buildings were – due to 
the numerous special grants in this area – has been relatively easy to manage for the local 
authorities, or rather the local school boards.      
4. The financing of education providers and the different allocation mechanisms    
The expenditures for education are not only spent in the educational institutions for recurrent 
expenses, capital investments, specific purposes and research, because the respective national 
education ministry and its regional and local administration bodies are also cost-intensive. 
Additionally, the indirect costs of education like the funding provided to students or their 
families by means of tax benefits, scholarships and subsidised loans to defray or delay the 
cost of tuition fees or living costs are also not redundant. However, in this section we only 
describe  the  different  forms of allocation mechanisms for universities and highlight some 
similarities and differences for education providers at primary and secondary schools.  
The political decision-makers have the following options to finance the universities: 
•  Earmarked grant based funding, The ministry of education shifts earmarked funds to a 
small number of universities or just even one university for a specific purpose. A handicap 
of grants for special purposes or earmarked grants is that they excluded per definition 
some universities and the grant receiving university is limited in its autonomy, because the 
university is only able to spend the fund on projects with are coverd by the goal of the 
grant. In Italy the central government and the province of Bozen-Southern Tyrol have 
arranged  special  treatments  for  the  University  of  Bozen,  because  it  is  a  trilingual 
university and the province is dominated by a German-speaking majority.  
•  Block grant based funding, The ministry of education transfers to each university or to a 
assembly of all universities a single block grant. A huge advantage of this form of funding 
is that the universities receive more flexibility and autonomy to launch their “own” funds, 
but if the amount of the block grant is not determined by a transparent formula but rather 
by  political  goals,  the  danger  of  political  pork  barreling  is  omnipresent.  A  interesting 
solution to avoid such political pork barreling exists in England with the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England (HEFCE). The HEFCE was founded in 1992 and is not part 
of the central government or one of its departments. Therefore the HEFCE works within a 
policy framework set by the Secretary of State for Education and Skills, but is not part of 
the Department for Education and Skills (DfES).After receiving a block grant from the 
central government the HEFCE distributes by its independent decision the funds to 87 
universities and 45 specialist institutions and general colleges in England. 20
•  Formula based funding, The ministry of education allocates the funds to the university 
based on a general formula. The factors of these formulas can be input-orientated – like 
the number of enrolled students at the universities, the number of employed staff at the 
universities or the salary amount of the university staff – or output-orientated, e.g. the 
number of students who are completing a university degree or the number of research 
publications  in  referred  journals.  In  Switzerland,  the  central  government  uses  input-
orientated factors for its formula to determine its basic subsidies to the universities as well 
as the horizontal, inter-cantonal education equalisation system. The respective formulas 
mainly consider the number of enrolled students for the legal duration of their studies at 
each university and weigh the academic disciplines differently, e.g. a PhD student has 
more  weight  than  a  bachelor  student  and  a  physics  student  has  more  weight  than  a 
business administration student. An output-orientated formula based funding can be found 
in Denmark. In 1994 the taximeter model was used for the university for the first time and 
the Danish tertiary education institutions do not receive any funds for students who do not 
take exams or who fail their exams.
26 Using such an allocation mechanism, the taximeter 
model creates such positive incentives for the universities to reduce the duration of study 
and  the dropout rates of the students. But on the other hand, a strict teaching quality 
control is necessary, because for a faculty or university it is now attractive to lower the 
work effort or to shift the failed student just to the lowest mark for passing the exam.   
•  Contract based funding, The ministry of education distributes the funds to the universities 
based on a contract. The contract includes general goals and a very detailed description for 
the  universities  and  can  be  input  or  output-orientated.  Moreover,  in  contracts  with  a 
medium or long term duration it is possible to incorporate some penalties if one of the 
contract party does not comply with the contract; e.g. the central government can hold 
back or even cut the funds in a three-year contract, if the university does not uphold the 
contract.  A  perennial  contract  based  funding  provides  the  universities  with  planning 
reliability and fund autonomy as long as they receive the goals and on the other hand the 
ministry of education is able to control and, if necessary, to punish the universities. In 
France  the  ministry  of  education  accredits  all  degree  programmes  of  the  universities. 
Since 1989 the universities have had to renew their accreditation every four years and the 
ministry  of  education  uses  this  procedure  to  evaluate  the  university  and  conclude 
individual  contracts  with  each  university.  Indeed  the  funds  of  the  contracts  from  the 
central  government  are  not  that  important  like  the  salary  of  university  staff  or  the 
subsidies  for  the  maintenance  of  the  buildings,  but  the  French  universities  take  these 21
reaccreditations very seriously. In Austria the central government concludes with every 
university  an  individual  performance  agreement (Leistungsvertrag)  for  a term of three 
years.  The  university  develops  the  draft  of  the  performance  agreement,  which  can  be 
negotiated between the university and the ministry of education. Compared to France, the 
Austrian contract funding is very embarrassing, because with the new three year period 
starting in 2007 nearly 80 % of the transfers from the central government to the university 
are  determined  by  the  contract.  Furthermore,  the  Austrian  ministry  of  education  has 
implemented a strict funds reduction if the universities default.  
•  Competitive  funds  (mainly  for  research  expenditure)  based  funding,  The  ministry  of 
education  announces  a  tender  of  funds  and  the  universities  submit  their  proposal  for 
receiving  the  funds.  The  competitive element of this allocative mechanism is that not 
every proposal of the university can be fulfilled and based on the evaluated ranking – this 
ranking can be arranged by the ministry of education itself or an independent evaluation 
institution  –  only  a  minority  of  universities  or  even  one  university  receive  the  funds. 
Competitive  funds  are  mainly  used  for  funds  regarding  the  research  of  universities  in 
Europe.  Since  1951  in  Germany  the  German  Research  Foundation  (DFG  –  Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft) has existed and it is funded by the central government and 16 
states.
27 Every university, faculty or even a academic person can submit their proposal for 
research funding to the DFG and the DFG rejects or approves the proposal. The politicians 
of the central government and the states are represented in all decision-making bodies, 
whereas scientists and academics hold the majority on the DFG boards. Fairly similar 
institutions to the German DFG are the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), the Swiss National 
Science Foundation (SNF), the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS), the 
Spanish  Office  for  Science  and  Technology  (OCYT),  the  Italian  National  Research 
Council  (CNR),  the  French  National  Scientific  Research  Centre  (CNRS),  the  Danish 
National  Research  Foundation  (Grundforskningsfonden)  and  the  Swedish  Research 
Council  (Vetenskapsrådet).  In  the  United  Kingdom  no  single  institution  exists  which 
includes  research  funding  of  all  relevant  scientific  disciplines;  rather,  a  number  of 
different public research funding institutions can be found and the most important are the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) and the Medical Research Council (MRC). 
•  Registration  fee  based  funding,  A  further  option  for  the  ministry  of  finance  is  that 
universities obtain the permission to ask the students for a registration fee or even general 
tuition fees. In Europe a tuition fees free study is a “holy cow”, because in some countries 22
– namely in France and in the Scandinavian countries – free education access is the goal 
of the politicians as well the majority of the voters. The supporters of the idea to avoid 
tuition fees believe that education is a public good and tuition fees will prevent potential 
students  from  blue-collar  families  from  embarking  on  a  university  career  and  only 
students from rich families will be able to go into higher education. It is undoubtedly true 
that  tertiary  education  has  a  positive  impact  on  a  nation’s  economy  and  therefore  a 
complete  private  university  system  is  not  reasonable.  However,  the  policy  of  banning 
tuition fees, which was practised in Germany and France over decades, has not generated 
a  higher  portion  of  students  from  blue-collar  families  in  the  universities  compared  to 
countries  with  tuition  fees.  The  United  Kingdom  introduced  tuition  fees  in  1998  and 
Austria,  Spain  and  Italy  and  Portugal  have  since  followed  suit.  In  Germany  with  the 
strong position of the 16 states in all education affairs the situation exists that some states 
have  recently  introduced  tuition  fees  while  the  majority  of  the  states  still  forbid  the 
universities to use such a revenue source from the direct education consumer.
28   
Additionally to the different financing systems of the universities in Europe we present some 
good samples of the administration and funding of the primary and secondary schools. Since 
1814  the right of a seven-year education has existed in Denmark and the institution of a 
comprehensive school (Folkeskole) is therefore even older than the first Danish constitution 
of 1849. Today the Folkeskole is a municipal matter and the central ministry of education 
fixes only the minim number of teaching hours per pupil or the general goal of the curriculum 
and publishes curriculum guidelines for the individual subjects.
29 The published curriculum 
guidelines are recommendations and as such are not mandatory as long as the general goals of 
the curriculum are not undermined. For this reason each Danish municipality is responsible 
for all elements of the Folkeskole like planning and the establishment of the school, hire and 
fire of the teachers as well as the school head, the size of a class and the number of teaching 
hours. The municipalities themselves are able to delegate some of the decisions or even all 
decisions  regarding  the  local  Folkeskole  to  elected  school  boards  (Skolebestyrelse).  The 
school boards are elected bodies consisting of the pupil, the parents of the pupils and the 
school head. The pupils are elected for one school year and the parents, who have the majority 
of seats of the school board, have a legislative period of four years. The school board decides 
about the textbooks, the distribution of the school budget funded by a block grant by the 
municipalities and, if the municipalities have delegated this right, about the class size, number 
of teaching hours and the teacher selection as well as the teacher salary.  23
Furthermore,  in  Denmark  a  transparent  regulation  of  funding  of  primary  and  secondary 
private schools exists. Parents are free to decide to send their children instead of a public 
Folkeskole  to  a  private  school  and  the  state  will  cover  80-85  %  of  the  total  current 
expenditure cost of the school and the remaining 15-20 % of the current education cost has to 
paid by the parents themselves. The private school has to be non-profit orientated and not 
linked to other private schools. Private schools have to generate their own “starting school 
budget” and construct their school building without any public financial support and receive 
the  public  funds  after  the  first  school  year.  The  private  schools  have  to  create,  like  the 
Folkeskole,  school  boards  on  which  the  parents  also  have  the  majority  of  the  seats.  The 
majority of the Danish private schools are Christian religious schools, Rudolf Steiner schools, 
German minority schools or Muslim
30 religious schools.   
In  England  compulsory  education  from  the  age of 5 to 16 exists and the majority of the 
primary and secondary schools are comprehensive schools, however in a small number of 
areas a grammar school system also exists. A uniform curriculum, which is divided into four 
“Key Stages”, four nationwide pupils tests, which are externally set and marked, and final 
uniform examinations tests (General Certificate of Secondary Education) are further features 
of the English education system. Due to the standardised national examinations it is possible 
to  receive  a  good  measurement  of  the  education  output  in  England  as  well  as  of  each 
individual school. Especially the school performance – since 1992 published by the so-called 
“League tables” – are a well known indicator for the parents to compare the school of their 
children and for the teacher to compare their effort and results with similar schools.  
The  Education  Reform  Act  of  1988  introduced  a  “market  type  mechanism”  (Glennerster, 
1991, page 1268), because – besides the introduction of the uniform examination test and the 
establishment of a new type of school
31 – the parents receive an increasing choice of the 
schools to which the parents can send their children. The reform process was concluded by 
the fact that the schools were funded mainly by the number of enrolled pupils, the school has 
to accept new pupils until they receive the capacity limit and the school boards receive more 
responsibility from the local authorities.   
Under  the  aspect  of  strengthening  accountability,  the  Education  Reform  Act  of  1988  is 
reasonable, because the consumers of education are able to make their decision on the basis of 
better information, the providers of education have an incentive to attract more consumers and 
the bureaucrats and the politicians have decentralised the daily business of the school to a 
school board and can develop general goals for a uniform curriculum.  24
5. Conclusion and policy implications  
During the last few years, countless studies have looked at decentralisation trends worldwide 
and  at  the  practical  implementation  of  fiscal  federalism.  Many  studies  have  analysed  the 
impact  of  fiscal  federalism  on  the  size  of  government  (for  a  good  overview  see  Feld, 
Kirchgässner and Schaltegger, 2003) or observed the impact of decentralization on economic 
growth (see, e.g., Davoodi and Zou, 1998) and stability (for example, Fukasaku and de Mello 
(1998)  and  Prud’homme,  1995).  Recent  studies  have  also  investigated  the  relationship 
between  decentralisation  of  government  activities  and  corruption  (Treisman,  2000;  Tanzi, 
2000;  Fisman  and  Gatti,  2002),  democratic  participation  (Huther  and  Shad,  1998)  or  tax 
morale (Torgler and Werner, 2005). However, in many areas the empirical evidence is mixed, 
which indicates the relevance to present more empirical results.  
The  goal  of  this  paper  was  to  provide  a  brief  overview  of  the  general  intergovernmental 
transfer structure in ten European countries and how the educational costs are considered in 
the respective transfer and grant system. Moreover, we have tried to classify the different 
conceptions and regulations, present the current reform process in every country and point out 
the strengths and weaknesses education system. 
However, we do not suggest that any of the ten European systems is the “unique golden 
example” for other industrialised or developing countries at all, because in the area of fiscal 
federalism and intergovernmental transfer system it is obvious that the phrases “one size fits 
all” is quite redundant. For a developing county the benefits of a detailed expenditure needs 
equalisation system like in the Nordic countries could be lower if the intensive cost to provide 
and prepare the necessary statistical data is borne in mind. Also, the reasonable horizontal 
education equalisation system between the Swiss cantons in University financing to reduce 
the spillover effect can develop its full successful impact only in a country which has a high 
subnational tax sovereignty and direct democracy options. Furthermore, a university building 
planning commission like in Germany needs a political background, which is described by 
Spahn  and  Franz  quite  skilfully  as  “Consensus  Democracy  and  Interjurisdictional  Fiscal 
Solidarity” (Spahn and Franz, 2002, page 122).  
Nevertheless,  the  presented  European  transfer  systems  and  their  impact  on  the  education 
system can be used as a spin-off for various sectors of fiscal reforms. Therefore, it will be 
interesting  to  observe  whether  fiscal  federalism  reform  tendencies  in  the  mentioned  ten 
European countries will have an impact on education in Europe in the future.  25
6. Appendix  
Table A1: Survey of some empirical research results offactors which affect the education output  
Factor  Empirical result  Literature 
Personal situation of the pupil:     
Socio-economic background           
of the pupil
Pupils  with  academic  parents  and 
high  number  of  available  books  at 
home reach better performance than 
pupils from blue collar families and 
a lower number of books  
Entwilse,  Alexander  and  Olson, 
1997; Albouy and  Waneck, 2003, 
Plug,  2004;  Schütz,  Ursprung  and 
Wößmann,  2005;  Schütz  and 
Wößmann, 2005  
Pupils from immigrants  Pupil  with  a migration background 
poll badly, however the main reason 
for this circumstance can be found 
in their socio-economic background           
Entorf and Minoiu, 2005 
Gender of the pupil Female pupils have a better reading 
performance than male pupils, while 
male  pupils  in  general  perform  
better  in  Mathematic  and  Natural 
Science than female pupils  
Fuchs and Wößmann, 2004a 
Equipment  and  personal  resources 
of the school 
   
Total expenditure per pupil  No  significant  effects  on  the  pupil 
performance 
Hanusek, 2003  
Class sizes No  significant  effects  on  the  pupil 
performance 
Meuret,  2001;  Hanushek,  2003; 
Wößmann, 2005  
Ratio of computers per pupil  No  significant  effects  on  the  pupil 
performance 
Fuchs and Wößmann, 2004b 
General teaching materials  Textbooks  and  construction 
materials have the highest impact of 
all  education  utilities  on  pupils' 
performance 
Pritchett  and  Filmer,  1999;  Fuchs 
and Wößmann, 2004a 
Institutional environment      
Infantile education / preschool  Positive  effect  on  the  pupil 
performance,  especially  on  pupils 
with a migration background  
Currie,  2001;  Cunha,  Heckman, 
Lochner, and Masterov, 2005 
Ratio of trade union members per 
total number of teachers 
Negative  effect  on  the  pupil 
performance 
Hoxby, 1996 
Competition between private and 
public, state run schools 
Positive  effect  on  the  pupil 
performance 
Neal, 2002; Hoxby, 2003 
Source: own illustration mainly adapted by Wößmann, 2006 26
Table A2: Distribution of the tax revenues in Austria between the Bund, states and municipalities in 2001 
and 2005 
2001  2005 
  Bund  States  Municipalities € billion  Bund  States  Municipalities € billion
Tobacco tax  100 %  --  --  1. 234  73.204 % 15.191% 11.605%  1,337 
Insurance 
tax 
100 %  --  --  0.814  73.204 % 15.191% 11.605%  1,135 
Payroll tax   100 %  --  --  3.876  73.204 % 15.191% 11.605%  2.071 
CIT   71.891 % 14.941 % 13.168 %  6.235  73.204 % 15.191% 11.605%  4,418 
PIT  71.891 % 14.941 % 13.68 %  3.814  73.204 % 15.191% 11.605%  2.235 
Wage tax  71.891 % 14.941 % 13.168 %  15.154  73.204 % 15.191% 11.605%  16.414 
VAT  67.437 % 18.341 % 14.222 %  16.48  73.204 % 15.191% 11.605%  17,94 
Tax on 
mineral oil 
91.91 %  6.75 %  2.394 %  2.880  73.204 % 15.191% 11.605%  3.565 
Property tax  --  --  100 %  0.479  --  --  100 %  0.523 * 
“local tax”  --  --  100 %  1.797  --  --  100 %  1.946 * 
Petty taxes  --  --  100 %  0.734  --  --  100 %  0.734 * 
* = tax revenues in 2004 
Source: Werner, forthcoming 
Table A3: Tax revenue assignments in Germany between the central government, the federal states and 
the municipalities in 2003 
Central Government States   Municipalities   Revenues in 2001 
Consumption tax   100 %       € 60.75 billion  
Inheritance tax     100 %     € 3.069 billion 
Property tax       100 %  € 9.076 billion  
PIT   42.5 %  42.5 %  15 %  € 141.396 billion  
Value added tax   51.4 %  46.5 %  2.1 %  € 138.935 billion  
CIT  50 %  50 %    € - 0.426 billion 
Interest rebate   44 %  44 %  12 %  € 29.846 billion  
Trade tax   14.8%  7.7%  77.5 %   € 24.533 billion  
Source: Werner, 2003, page 83 
Table A4: Fixed portion from tax-sharing for the five Italian Special Statue Regions (SSR)
32  
Valle d'Aosta  Trentino-Alto 
Adige 
Sicily  Sardinia  Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia 
PIT  90%  90%  100%  70%  40% 
CIT  90%  90%  100%  70%  40% 
Interest rebate  90%  90%  90%  --  -- 
Stamp tax  90%  90%  90%  90%  -- 
TV tax  --  90%  100%  --  -- 
Motor vehicle tax  90%  90%  100%  --  --  27
Table A4: Fixed portion from tax-sharing for the five Italian Special Statue Regions (SSR)  
Valle d'Aosta  Trentino-Alto 
Adige 
Sicily  Sardinia  Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia 
Inheritance tax  90%  90%  100%  50%  -- 
Alcohol tax  90%  90%  100%  90%  -- 
Beer tax  90%  90%  90%  90%  -- 
Tax on mineral oil  90%  90%  100%  90%  -- 
Electricity tax   90%  100%  90%  90%  100% 
Tobacco tax   90%  90%  100%  90%  -- 
        Source: Brosio, 2004, page 19 
Table A5: Distribution of the tax revenues in Spain between the central government (CG), the regions and 
the municipalities for 2002-2006  
“Foral” regions and CG  15 regions and CG 
  CG  Region  Municipalities CG  Region  Municipalities
33
Personal income tax  --  100%  --  67%  33%  -- 
Corporate income tax   --  100%  --  100%  --  -- 
Value added tax   --  100%  --  65%  35%  -- 
Tax on mineral oil  --   100%  --  60%  40%  --  
Tobacco tax  --  100%  --  60%  40%  -- 
Alcohol tax   --  100%  --  60%  40%  -- 
Property tax  --  --  100%  --  --  100% 
Insurance tax  --  100%  --  100%  --  -- 
Local trade tax  --  100%  --  --  --  100% 
Tax on vehicles   --   --  100%  --  --  100% 
Tax on vehicle accreditation  --  100%  --  --  100%  -- 
Tax on electricity   --  100%  --  --  100%  -- 
   Source: author's own illustration     
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